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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes whether a minimum wage can be an optimal redistribution policy when
distorting taxes and lump-sum transfers are also available in a competitive economy. Addi-
tionally, we study the optimal mix of redistribution tools for di⁄erent values of the structural
parameters of the model.
Conventional wisdom maintains that a minimum wage is an ine¢ cient policy tool. The
main reason behind this argument is the employment loss associated with minimum wage
legislation. As labor input becomes more expensive, ￿rms reduce hiring with the consequent
welfare loss. However, there are also distortions linked to the use of taxes. Labor income
taxation introduces a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal
rate of transformation between consumption and leisure. As a result, individual labor and
consumption decisions are also distorted. Hence, when a minimum wage and labor taxes
are considered jointly, the optimal redistribution policy should seek a balance between the
ine¢ ciencies due to each of the policy tools.
We build a static general equilibrium model with two types of household, perfectly com-
petitive ￿rms and a government. Households only di⁄er in their labor productivity. Firms
use both types of labor as the only inputs to produce a single consumption good. A Ramsey
planner implements the optimal redistribution policy, making decisions on taxes, transfers,
and minimum wage. The aim of the planner￿ s policy is to maximize a weighted sum of the
households￿utility. We solve the model for di⁄erent parameter settings and examine the
optimal mix of policy instruments.
We ￿nd that, depending upon the economy parameterization, the optimal policy may
imply the use of only taxes and transfers, only a minimum wage or the proper combination
of both policies. We also learn that the key parameter determining the optimality of the
minimum wage is the change in low-skilled labor when this lower bound on wages is enforced.
When low-skilled labor is inelastic to the introduction of a minimum wage, the planner ￿nds
1it optimal. This happens when there are few low-skilled households, the complementarity
between the two types of input is large or the di⁄erence in productivity between one unit of
low-skilled labor and one unit of high-skilled labor is small.
A lot of research has been carried out into the empirical e⁄ect of minimum wage laws.
Dolado et al (1996), OECD (1998) and Dickens et al (1999) survey the main results reached
by this branch of the literature. But the number of articles that follow a theoretical approach
to the issue is much scarcer.1 Most of these papers aim to prove that under the assumption of
some kind of market failure, the use of a minimum wage can be employment and/or welfare
enhancing. Considering di⁄erent economic frameworks, this is the case of DrŁze and Gollier
(1993), Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), Cahuc and Michel (1996), Swinnerton (1996), Lang and
Kahn (1998), Bhaskar and To (1999) Sampson and Simmons (2002) and Askenazy (2003).
There is also some research that considers the optimal implementation of minimum wage
laws to redistribute. Marceau and Boadway (1994) ￿nd su¢ cient conditions for a minimum
wage being welfare improving when it is combined with unemployment bene￿ts in an economy
with informational asymmetries. In Boadway and Cahuc (2001), it is proven that, under pri-
vate information, non-linear taxes and a minimum wage might increase welfare when typical
features of the welfare system are assumed.
Finally, Allen (1987) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) are the papers most closely related
to ours. They build a general equilibrium model and study whether a minimum wage can
improve welfare in an economy with linear or with non-linear taxes on income. Both articles
￿nd that minimum wages might be optimally combined with linear taxes. However, when
non-linear taxes are considered the minimum wage is no longer optimal. Assumptions made
on functional forms for technology and preferences may limit their results. In our paper we
assume more general formulations for these two functions. Additionally, the approach we
follow allows us to compute the optimal size of the minimum wage and to characterize the
optimal mix of policy tools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and
describe the driving forces of an economy in which the minimum wage binds; we also char-
1Dolado et al (2000) goes through the theoretical literature that considers the role of minimum wages as
a redistribution policy tool.
2acterize the Ramsey planner￿ s problem. In section 3 we present the numerical results of the
model; we analyze the distortions caused by the policy tools considered and the e⁄ect of
optimal policy on allocations; then, we study the optimal mix of policies depending on the
structural parameterization of the economy. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a static general equilibrium model. There are two types of household. A measure
￿ of households are high-skilled (H), and 1 ￿ ￿ are low-skilled (L). A single consumption
good is produced. The resource constraint of the economy is:
￿cH + (1 ￿ ￿)cL = y; (1)
where y is the aggregate production, and cH and cL denote high-skilled and low-skilled
consumption respectively.
2.1. Firms
The representative ￿rm uses high-skilled and low-skilled workers to produce output. The
constant returns to scale production function is characterized as follows:
y = F [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)] =
h
￿[￿(1 ￿ ‘H)]




where ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿ > 1, and (1 ￿ ‘H) and (1 ￿ ‘L) are high-skilled and low-skilled labor




.2 Parameter ￿ measures the di⁄erence in productivity between high-skilled
2With ￿ = 1 we have perfect substitutability between inputs and ￿ = 0 yields a Cobb-Douglas production
function.






















Type i 2 fH;Lg households derive utility from consumption and leisure. The utility function
is:
U(ci;‘i); (3)
where U is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave in both arguments. Households are
endowed with one unit of time which can be devoted to work or leisure, and face the following
budget constraint:
ci = (1 ￿ ￿)!i(1 ￿ ‘i) + T; (4)
where !i is wage, ￿ is the income tax rate and T is a lump-sum transfer.
2.3. Minimum Wage
In addition, there is a statutory minimum wage in this economy. Therefore, in equilibrium,
wages must be higher than a legal lower bound, !min. When the minimum wage is binding
in equilibrium, there is an excess labor supply and the demand side determines labor allo-
cations. Although in this economy there are two types of labor, we only consider parameter
con￿gurations for which only low-skilled workers may be constrained. Therefore, because of
the minimum wage legislation, low-skilled households face an additional restriction: there is
a maximum number of hours, SCL,3 they can allocate to work at the minimum wage !min.
3SCL(!min) depends on !min. To simplify notation, we do not make this relationship explicit in what
follows.
4SCL is equal to the hours of low-skilled labor that the ￿rm demands at the minimum wage
in equilibrium.4




s.t. ci = (1 ￿ ￿)!i(1 ￿ ‘i) + T
(1 ￿ ‘i) ￿ SCi
!i, SCi, ￿, T given
The ￿rst order conditions for this problem are:
￿Uc(ci;‘i)(1 ￿ ￿)!i + U‘(ci;‘i) + ￿i = 0
￿i
￿
SCi ￿ (1 ￿ ‘i)
￿
= 0
SCi ￿ (1 ￿ ‘i) ￿ 0 ￿i ￿ 0
ci = (1 ￿ ￿)!i(1 ￿ ‘i) + T
We consider economies where the minimum wage only binds for low-skilled workers, i.e.,
high-skilled labor will never be constrained. Hence,
SCH ￿ (1 ￿ ‘H) > 0:
2.4. Government
The government is a social planner who chooses labor income taxes, lump sum transfers, and
the minimum wage so as to maximize welfare. The welfare function we consider is:
4We follow the disequilibrium theory approach to model the e⁄ect of minimum wages on the household
problem. See Malinvaud (1977).
5W = ’￿U (cH;‘H) + (1 ￿ ’)(1 ￿ ￿)U (cL;‘L);
where ’ is the weight of high-skilled workers in the welfare function.
Tax revenues are rebated to households through a lump sum transfer. The government
budget must be balanced. Hence, her budget constraint can be written as:
T = ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ‘H)!H + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)!L]: (5)
2.5. Equilibrium
In this economy, an equilibrium is de￿ned as follows:
De￿nition 1. Given a minimum wage !min, allocations (cH;cL;‘H;‘L), taxes and transfers
(￿;T), wages (!H;!L) and perceived constraints on the low-skilled labor supply SCL constitute
an equilibrium if the following conditions are satis￿ed:
(i) (cH;‘H) solves the high-skilled household￿ s decision problem given !H and policies (￿;T).
(ii) (cL;‘L) solves the low-skilled household￿ s decision problem given !L, policies (￿;T) and
SCL.
(iii) (‘H;‘L) maximizes ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts given !H and !L.
(iv) The equilibrium wage !L is equal to or higher than !min. And SCL is the quantity of
low-skilled labor demanded at the minimum wage !min.
!L ￿ !min = F‘L
￿
￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)SCL
￿
:
(v) The economy resource constraint (1) and government budget constraint (5) hold.
An equilibrium where no redistribution policy is implemented, that is, the minimum wage
is not binding (!L > !min) and taxes and transfers are set to zero, is called a competitive






L) allocations and wages that constitute
a competitive equilibrium.
To gain insight into the main driving forces of the economy, let us describe how equilibrium
allocations are determined, given a policy (!min;￿;T), when the minimum wage binds. Given
the minimum wage, !min, the production side determines the equilibrium high-skilled to low-
skilled labor ratio,
1￿‘H
1￿‘L(!min), and high-skilled workers￿wage, !H(!min). The high-skilled to
































Then, households choose how many hours to work and how much to consume. High-
skilled households￿consumption, cH, and leisure, ‘H, are such that the following ￿rst order
conditions are satis￿ed at the equilibrium wage, !H(!min):
￿Uc (cH;‘H)(1 ￿ ￿)!H(!min) + U‘ (cH;‘H) = 0; and
cH = (1 ￿ ￿)!H(!min)(1 ￿ ‘H) + T:
Finally, low-skilled labor allocation, 1￿‘L, is such that the labor ratio,
1￿‘H
1￿‘L(!min), holds,
while low-skilled consumption, cL, is such that the corresponding budget constraint is ful￿lled.
Therefore, when the minimum wage binds, the production side determines wages and
labor composition, while the households￿side determines consumption and labor allocations.
As equation (6) indicates, for a given parameterization, the higher the binding minimum
wage, the higher the equilibrium high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio. As low-skilled labor
becomes more expensive, ￿rms use it less. At the same time, equation (7) shows that as
7relatively more high-skilled workers are hired, their marginal productivity and wage decrease.
These two relationships are formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The elasticity of the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio,
1￿‘H
1￿‘L, with respect





























The proof of the proposition, as for the proof of the other results in the paper, is technical
and can be found in the appendix.
Corollary 1. If !min > !￿








Corollary 1 implies that if the minimum wage binds in equilibrium, regardless of the use
of taxes and transfers, high-skilled workers￿wage is lower than it would be at the competitive
equilibrium, while the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio is higher than at the competitive
equilibrium.
Corollary 2. The elasticity of the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio,
1￿‘H
1￿‘L, with respect
to the low-skilled wage, !L, depends positively on parameter ￿ and negatively on ￿ and ￿.
Corollary 2 states the e⁄ects of the structural parameters describing technology on the
elasticity of the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio with respect to the minimum wage. As
￿, grows, i.e. as inputs become closer substitutes, it is easier to substitute low-skilled workers
for high-skilled ones. Therefore, the e⁄ect of the introduction of a minimum wage on the
high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio is larger.
8As ￿ increases, high-skilled workers are more productive, and, again, it becomes easier to
replace any ￿xed number of low-skilled workers. Thus, a minimum wage harms low-skilled
labor hiring less.
Lastly, the larger the measure of high-skilled households, the more essential low-skilled
labor is in the production process and, hence, the e⁄ects of a minimum wage legislation on
equilibrium low-skilled labor allocations are more limited.
2.6. The Ramsey Problem
The government is a Ramsey planner. She takes households￿reaction to policy announcements
into account when solving for the optimal redistribution policy. Our analysis builds on the
primal approach to optimal taxation. The planner selects the policy that maximizes the
welfare function over equilibrium allocations. In order to solve the Ramsey problem, we
eliminate wages, taxes, and transfers from the set of equations that determine an equilibrium
using the households and ￿rm ￿rst order conditions. The following proposition states that
the set of equilibrium allocations can be characterized by ￿ve conditions.
Proposition 2. Given a minimum wage !min, allocations (cH;cL;‘H;‘L), taxes and transfers
(￿;T), wages (!H;!L) and perceived constraints on the low-skilled labor supply SCL constitute
an equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satis￿ed:
Uc (cH;‘H)cH!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)!H (1 ￿ ‘H) ￿ [Uc (cH;‘H)!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)]y = 0; (8)
Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H ￿ 0; (9)
[Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H]
￿
SCL ￿ (1 ￿ ‘L)
￿
= 0; (10)
SCL ￿ (1 ￿ ‘L) ￿ 0; (11)
and
(1 ￿ ￿)cL + ￿cH = y; (12)
with
!L = F‘L [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)];
9!H = F‘H [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)];
y = F [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)]:
Equations (8) and (9) are what the literature calls implementability constraints. They
are the result of substituting out prices and policies in the high-skilled and low-skilled budget
constraints using household problem ￿rst order conditions. Equations (9), (10), and (11)
encompass the possibility of ￿nding constrained low-skilled labor. Finally, equation (12) is
the market clearing condition.
This new characterization of the equilibrium allows us to de￿ne the set of equilibria as




, instead of as a function of prices, (!H;!L),
and policies, (!min;￿;T). Therefore, the primal approach to optimal policy taxation can be
applied.
The Ramsey problem can be written as follows:
max
fcL;cH;‘L;‘H;SCLg
’￿U (cH;‘H) + (1 ￿ ’)(1 ￿ ￿)U (cL;‘L)
s.t.
Uc (cH;‘H)cH!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)!H (1 ￿ ‘H) ￿ [Uc (cH;‘H)!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)]y = 0;
Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H ￿ 0;
[Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H]
￿
SCL ￿ (1 ￿ ‘L)
￿
= 0;
SCL ￿ (1 ￿ ‘L) ￿ 0;
(1 ￿ ￿)cL + ￿cH = y;
!L = F‘L [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)];
!H = F‘H [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)];
and
y = F [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)]:
10Taking derivatives with respect to cL, cH, ‘L, ‘H and SCL we obtain the system of equations
that have to be solved to ￿nd the optimal allocation.5.
3. Results
The aim of the paper is to analyze the optimal mix of minimum wage, taxes and transfers in
order to maximize social welfare. In this section we numerically compute the optimal policy.
We ￿rst analyze the distortions and the allocation e⁄ects caused by a binding minimum wage
and by a tax-transfer scheme. Then we perform several numerical exercises to study how
di⁄erent parameterizations a⁄ect the optimal redistribution policy.







We do not calibrate. We simply consider a widely used range of values for each parameter.
The parameter controlling the elasticity of labor supply, ￿, varies between 0.5 and 3. The
parameter setting the relative productivity of high-skilled workers, ￿, ranges from 1.15 to 2.
The parameter a⁄ecting the elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled workers,
￿, extends from -1 to 0.9. The measure of high-skilled households, ￿, varies from 0.2 to 0.8.
Finally, the social planner attaches the same weight to the utility of both types of household,
that is, ’ is set equal to 0.5.
3.1. Distortions and Allocations E⁄ects
In this section, we explain ￿rst what the main distortions caused by either a minimum wage
or a tax and transfer scheme are. And then we describe the most important e⁄ects of each
redistribution instrument on allocations. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider each
instrument on its own. Hence, when analyzing minimum wage, we will set taxes to zero, and
when studying taxes, we will set the minimum wage to zero.
5The system of ￿rst order conditions and the procedure used to ￿nd numerically optimal allocations can
be found in Appendix B.
113.1.1. Distortions
Minimum Wage
When the minimum wage binds, two important distortions appear. On the production
side, low-skilled labor gets more expensive and ￿rms hire less of it. Thus, there is an employ-
ment loss and the composition of inputs becomes distorted. On the consumer side, low-skilled
workers are willing to work more hours than the ￿rm ￿nds pro￿table to hire them for. As a
result, low-skilled labor is in excess supply. The following equilibrium inequality shows this
e⁄ect:
Uc (cL;‘L)!min > U‘ (cL;‘L):
Taxes and transfers
This case has been widely studied in the literature and the results are well-known. Taxes
distort consumers￿decisions by introducing a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
and the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and leisure. The labor supply
shifts leftwards and a deadweight loss arises. The following equilibrium equation shows the
e⁄ect:
(1 ￿ ￿)!i =
U‘ (ci;‘i)
Uc (ci;‘i)
for i 2 fH;Lg.
3.1.2. E⁄ects on Allocations
Minimum Wage
If a minimum wage is optimal, low-skilled workers are more expensive and ￿rms hire less
of them. Numerical exercises show that low-skilled workers devote more time to leisure and
consume less than at the competitive equilibrium. The utility gains due to more leisure time
are higher than utility losses caused by the consumption drop, and low-skilled agents enjoy
larger utility. High-skilled workers see their wage decrease and reduce their consumption.
Finally, depending on the sign of the elasticity of labor supply, they may increase or decrease
the time they devote to production activities. In any case, high-skilled workers are worse o⁄.
12Actually, the e⁄ect of a binding minimum wage on high-skilled and low-skilled utility does
not depend on assumed functional forms or on the model parameterization. This result is
formally proven in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. When the Ramsey planner ￿nds it optimal to set a minimum wage high-
skilled workers are worse o⁄ and low-skilled ones are better o⁄ than they were at the com-
petitive equilibrium.
Taxes and transfers
The same arguments used in Proposition 3 can be used to prove that when redistribution
is implemented through taxes and transfers, high-skilled workers are worse o⁄and low-skilled
workers are better o⁄ than they were at the competitive equilibrium. Our numerical results
show that low-skilled households work less than at the competitive equilibrium. Their con-
sumption increases except for cases in which productivity di⁄erentials are very small. High-
skilled household consumption decreases. Again, the sign of the elasticity of labor supply
makes the e⁄ect on hours worked by high-skilled households ambiguous .
3.2. Numerical Analysis of Optimal Policies
We examine the e⁄ect on minimum wages, taxes and transfers of moving pairs of parameters
while keeping the others ￿xed at a benchmark parameterization (see Table 1).
Table 1: Benchmark Parameterization
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’
2 1:5 0:3 0:5 0:5
We ￿nd that, depending on the structural parameters, it may be optimal to use only taxes
and transfers, only minimum wages or both to implement the redistribution policy.
In general terms, we ￿nd that for parameterizations that imply high labor productivity
inequality, taxes and transfers are a better redistribution tool. As labor productivity gets
more equally distributed, minimum wage becomes optimal.
13Why does minimum wage appear to be optimal when labor productivity inequality de-














Since we only consider the optimal policy for parameter values such that
!L
!H is smaller than
one, as the ratio above increases di⁄erences in labor productivity decrease. Therefore, labor
productivity inequality falls when low-skilled households are a scarce resource (￿ large), more
complementary to high-skilled workers (￿ small), or similarly productive to them (￿ close to
one).
Corollary 2 states that the smaller ￿ or the larger ￿ or ￿, the smaller the elasticity of the
high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio,
1￿‘H
1￿‘L, with respect to the low-skilled wage, !L. Thus,
low inequality implies low elasticity.
Then we can restate our question as: Why does the minimum wage appear not to be
optimal when the elasticity of the high to low-skilled labor ratio with respect to the low-
skilled wage is large? In such a case, a binding minimum wage causes a large reduction in
both the relative hiring of low-skilled workers and the high-skilled wage. Consequently, the fall
in both types of households￿consumption is likely to be higher. The e⁄ects on social welfare
are twofold. On the one hand, the low-skilled utility loss caused by the drop in consumption
increases and could even outweigh the gain due to the larger leisure enjoyed. On the other
hand, drops in high-skilled consumption result in larger utility decreases. Therefore, the
probability is that a minimum wage will not be welfare improving.
Figures 1 to 9 display the optimal mix of policies depending on pairs of parameters. The
numerical exercises yield ￿ve di⁄erent possible combinations of optimal policies: (1) only
taxes and transfers (dark blue), (2) taxes, transfers and minimum wage (light blue), (3) only
minimum wage (green), (4) minimum wage with negative taxes and transfers (orange), and
(5) no redistribution policy (red).6
6This last case also includes parameterizations such that low skilled income is higher than high skilled
income at the competitive equilibrium.
14For example in Figure 1 when ￿ equals 0.3 and ￿ equals 1, the optimal policy considers
only taxes and transfers (dark blue), while when ￿ equals 0.5 and ￿ equals 1, it is optimal
to use taxes, transfers and minimum wage (light blue). Finally, when ￿ equals 0.75 and ￿
equals 1.5, no redistribution policy is found to be optimal (red).
Figures 1 to 4 exhibit the optimal mix of policies for di⁄erent values of the measure
of high-skilled households, ￿, combined with di⁄erent values of the remaining parameters.
In all cases, as ￿ grows, or as the measure of low-skilled people decreases, the minimum
wage appears as an optimal redistribution policy, regardless of the values of the rest of the
parameters. When the measure of high-skilled people is low, only taxes are used. As we
consider economies with more high-skilled people, a combination of taxes and minimum wage
becomes optimal. There is always a narrow region where only a minimum wage is considered,
but as ￿ approaches one, (negative) taxes arise again. Finally, for values of ￿ very close to
one, the optimal policy is no policy.
As low-skilled workers become scarce, they turn out to be more productive (labor pro-
ductivity inequality is reduced), and the ￿rm does not reduce the use of such workers even
when a minimum wage is introduced. When ￿ is close to one, both workers are so similar
that redistribution is not optimal.
Let us now analyze how the optimal mix of policies changes when the elasticity of substi-
tution between inputs, ￿, varies. This is done in Figures 3 to 8. In all cases, as ￿ decreases, or
as the inputs become more complementary, it is optimal to use a minimum wage for redistri-
bution. As before, this e⁄ect is true independently of the values of the rest of the parameters.
When low and high-skilled labor are complements, ￿ low, it is harder for ￿rms to substitute
low-skilled for high-skilled labor, so the introduction of a minimum wage has a small e⁄ect
on the relative hiring of low-skilled labor.
Figures 2 and 7 to 9 show the e⁄ects of ￿ on the optimal redistribution policy mix. In
all cases, as ￿ approaches one, or as the productivities of one unit of low-skilled and one
unit of high-skilled labor become almost equal, it is optimal to use a minimum wage for
redistribution. Again, this e⁄ect is true no matter what values the rest of the parameters
take. When the two inputs are very similar, ￿ close to one, the elasticity of the high to
low-skilled labor ratio with respect to the minimum wage is low. Hence, a minimum wage
15has a smaller negative e⁄ect on the low-skilled workers￿relative employment, consumption
and welfare.
Finally, Figures 1, 5, 6, and 9 display the optimal redistribution policy tools for di⁄erent
values of ￿. This is the preference parameter that determines the size and sign of the elasticity
of labor supply. As can be observed in the ￿gures, the e⁄ects of the rest of the parameters
cancel out any possible e⁄ect of ￿ on the optimal policy. This is due to the fact that changes in
these parameters a⁄ect the elasticity of labor supply of both types of household symmetrically.
Therefore, any change in ￿ does not directly a⁄ect the labor productivity ratio of the economy.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the optimality of a minimum wage as a redistribution policy tool
in a competitive economy where distorting taxes and lump-sum transfers are also available.
Additionally, we have computed the proper combination of policies for di⁄erent values of the
structural parameters of the model.
We have shown that labor productivity di⁄erentials are a crucial factor in explaining
the optimal policy mix. Whenever productivity inequality decreases, the minimum wage
appears to be optimal on its own or properly combined with a tax-transfer scheme. In
our economy, low-skilled workers￿relative productivity is larger when low-skilled workers
are scarce, when low-skilled labor is a good complement to high-skilled labor, or when the
di⁄erence in productivity of one unit of any input is small. In that case, we have proven
that a statutory lower bound on wages does not greatly alter low-skilled labor allocation in
equilibrium. Thus, larger welfare gains due to a minimum wage make its use to implement
the optimal redistribution policy more likely.
There are several additional issues that we have not considered and that we leave for
future analysis. First, our model is static and deterministic. Hence, a natural extension is to
consider a dynamic and/or stochastic version of the economy. Our guess is that a minimum
wage might be a useful policy as a bu⁄er to soften the e⁄ects of shocks. Second, since we only
study a static version, we do not consider capital. A binding minimum wage changes input
productivity and could have an important impact on capital accumulation and growth. As a
16result, the optimal policy design might also be di⁄erent. Finally, we only consider a Ramsey
problem. Golosov et al (2003) have shown that an alternative approach considering dynamic
and stochastic general equilibrium models with asymmetric information may alter standard
optimal policy.
17Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Di⁄erentiating the inverse low-skilled labor demand:













































































Now we check the e⁄ect of changes in !L in the high-skilled workers￿wage. Given !L, the


















































































Proof of Proposition 2. First, we prove that a competitive equilibrium implies
equations (8)-(12).
Notice that conditions (11) and (12) are ful￿lled by de￿nition of a competitive equilibrium.
From the ￿rst order conditions of the households￿problems the following equations should
be satis￿ed in equilibrium:
￿Uc (cL;‘L)(1 ￿ ￿)!L + U‘ (cL;‘L) + ￿L = 0 (13)
￿L
￿
SCL ￿ (1 ￿ ‘L)
￿
= 0 (14)
SCL ￿ (1 ￿ ‘L) ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ 0 (15)
cL = (1 ￿ ￿)!L (1 ￿ ‘L) + T (16)




cH = (1 ￿ ￿)!H (1 ￿ ‘H) + T (18)
Substituting (17) into (13) and solving for the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ￿L, we get:
￿L =
Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H
Uc (cH;‘H)!H
￿ 0:
19This result and expressions (14) and (15) imply equation (10):
[Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H]
￿




Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H ￿ 0:
Finally, from equation (17), the high-skilled consumer budget constraint (18) and the gov-
ernment budget constraint (5) we get equation (8):
Uc (cH;‘H)cH!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)!H (1 ￿ ‘H) ￿ [Uc (cH;‘H)!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)]y = 0
Now we will prove that for any set of allocations cL, cH, ‘L and ‘H ful￿lling equations (8)-
(12) we can construct a process for policies f￿;T;!ming and prices f!L;!Hg that constitute
a competitive equilibrium.
Wage rates are determined from allocations ‘L and ‘H and equations:
!L = F‘L [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)]
!H = F‘H [￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ‘L)]
The labor income tax rate and transfers will be pinned down by:




When the following expression
Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H
20is strictly positive, SCL = 1 ￿ ‘L, that is, the minimum wage law is binding and therefore,
!min = F‘L
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)SCL
￿
When it is equal to zero, then the minimum wage is not binding
￿
SCL > 1 ￿ ‘L
￿
and
there are multiple values for !min satisfying the required conditions:
!min < F‘L
￿
￿(1 ￿ ‘H);(1 ￿ ￿)SCL
￿
Equation (14) holds if ￿L is de￿ned as,
￿L =
Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H
Uc (cH;‘H)!H
Finally, we prove that allocations and prices are such that households￿budget constraints
are ful￿lled. From (8), considering the way in which we have de￿ned and computed tax rates
and transfers, we have:
Uc (cH;‘H)cH!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)!H (1 ￿ ‘H) ￿ [Uc (cH;‘H)!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)]y = 0;
which implies





(1 ￿ ‘H) ￿ T = 0;
which is equivalent to
cH ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!H (1 ￿ ‘H) ￿ T = 0:
Once we have proven that the high-skilled household budget constraint holds, this restric-
tion, the resource constraint (12) and the government budget constraint (5) guarantee that
the low-skilled budget constraint is also satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us denote with a superscript R policies and allocations









H). Ramsey equilibrium maximizes



























f(c;‘) : c ￿ !￿
H(1 ￿ ‘)g, allocation (cR
H;‘R
H) was available to high-skilled households when the
optimal minimum wage was zero. In that case, allocation (c￿
H;‘￿
H) was chosen, therefore it
must be better than (cR
H;‘R






This appendix presents the Ramsey problem ￿rst order conditions that characterize the op-
timal policy. Besides it is also described the procedure used to solve the system of equations.
The Lagrangian function associated to the Ramsey problem:
L = ’￿U (cH;‘H) + (1 ￿ ’)(1 ￿ ￿)U (cL;‘L) +
+￿
1 fUc (cH;‘H)cH!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)!H (1 ￿ ‘H) ￿ [Uc (cH;‘H)!H ￿ U‘ (cH;‘H)]yg +
+￿
2 [(1 ￿ ￿)cL + ￿cH ￿ y] +
+￿
3 [Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H] +
+￿
4 ￿




5 [Uc (cL;‘L)U‘ (cH;‘H)!L ￿ Uc (cH;‘H)U‘ (cL;‘L)!H]
￿
SCL ￿ (1 ￿ ‘L)
￿



















c !H ￿ U
H

































































































= (1 ￿ ’)(1 ￿ ￿)U
L
c + ￿



































































































To solve for the optimal policies, we follow a two-step procedure:
Step 1: Let us assume ￿rst that the minimum wage constraint is binding. In that case
we know that:










‘ !H > 0 ￿
3 = 0













(1 ￿ ’)(1 ￿ ￿)U
L
c + ￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿) = 0
From (22) and (23), the following can be obtained:






These last four equations jointly with the restriction (8) in the planner￿ s problem and the
resource constraint (12) constitute a system of six equations to be solved for cL;cH;‘L;‘H;￿
1;
and ￿
2. After solving this set of equations, we substitute into (9) to check the sign of the
inequality. When the sign is positive, it is optimal to set a minimum wage that will be
binding. Otherwise, greater welfare is attained under a perfectly competitive labor market .
Equilibrium allocations for such a case are computed following directions presented in Step
2.
Step 2: when it is not optimal to set a minimum wage, no worker will be constrained in
24the labor market. As a result,










‘ !H = 0 ￿
3 > 0
Substituting into the Ramsey problem ￿rst order conditions (19), (20) and (22) and

























(1 ￿ ’)(1 ￿ ￿)U
L
c + ￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
We substitute this expression for ￿ into the three equations above. Then, these three









‘ !H = 0;
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